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Abstract
In recent times, both the time spent on education and the age at first union formation have significantly
increased in Italy and Spain. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the endogeneity of the two
processes. We use Panel data (European Community Household Panel), which provide detailed
standardised information for both countries about education and training processes as a well as household
formation. The effect of unobservable characteristics affecting the two processes at the same time has been
controlled for, using simultaneous hazard modelling. On the one hand, the exit from the educational
system increases the risk of entering the first union. On the other hand, there exist individual unobserved
characteristics that influence the occurrence of the two processes simultaneously. If these characteristics
are not controlled for, the effect of a completed education on union formation becomes biased upward.
1.  Introduction
Educational career and union formation represent two important processes shaping the transition
from childhood to adulthood. The study of such processes is particularly interesting in Italy and
Spain, where marriages have increasingly been postponed, the emergence of cohabiting unions is
still limited, fertility is at “lowest-low” levels, and the duration of an individual's education is
increasingly prolonged (De Sandre et al., 2000; Ongaro, 2001; Sabbadini, 1997; Kohler et al.,
2001; Delgado and Castro Martin, 1999; Baizan, 2001; Tobio, 2001). These two trajectories are
part of the individual’s life course strategy: decisions affecting one process are potentially also
affecting the other. Thus, in order to understand each process, it is important to take into account
the causal reciprocal relationship, and at the same time to control for the possible existence of
factors that determine  both processes simultaneously.
The literature is rich  in theoretical and empirical studies that show how enrolment in school
and the educational level affect the timing and occurrence of union formation. For instance,
prolonged investments in human capital decreases women’s gain from marriage (Becker, 1991)
and delays the transition to economic stability that is needed before forming a union
(Oppenheimer, 1988). Enrolment in education delays the entry into first union (Liefbroer and
Corijn, 1999; Hoem, 1986) not only due to economic reasons, but also because of the effect of
social norms  which generate the incompatibility between the youth role of being a student, and
the adult role implied by marital status (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991).
In the literature, we also find evidence for the reverse effect of union formation on school
progression. Indeed, it has been shown that once an individual enters a union, he or she is2
exposed to a higher risk of ending school (Davis and Bumpass, 1976; McLaughlin et al., 1986),
and that such effects are stronger for women than for men (Marini, 1978; Alexander and Reilly,
1981; Teachman and Polonko, 1988).
Once the mutual relations between the two processes are taken into account, the existence of
common factors which influence the processes simultaneously must be tested. Indeed, the
processes have been shown to be endogenous in the sense that there exist unobservable
characteristics which simultaneously determine individual choice about both union formation
and educational attainment (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1984; Sander, 1992; Lillard et al., 1994).
In this paper, the processes of first union formation (without distinguishing between
marriage and consensual unions) and final exit from education are modelled, using transition rate
models (Blossfeld and Rower, 1995), employing both individual and household characteristics as
explanatory variables. Moreover, simultaneous hazard modelling (Lillard, 1993) is used in order
to control for the existence of unobservable factors affecting both processes.
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). Such data provides
for both countries standardised information about characteristics of the household and of the
individual which  can  affect the processes under study.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, the theoretical background that supports the
hypothesis of interrelation between the processes and their common determinants is outlined. In
section 3 the existing literature about household formation and educational career in Italy and
Spain is reviewed. Section 4 discusses the data and the methods implemented. In section 5 the
results are reported, focusing on the interrelation between the processes, and on their
endogeneity. Finally, in section 6, the main findings are summarised.
2.  Theoretical framework
In the literature, the effect of individual and household characteristics on union formation and
educational progression processes has been widely explored. But, since we mainly want to focus
on the causal effect of each process on the other, we will discuss in this section only the
theoretical background that supports our hypothesis: the existence of a strong interrelation
between the two life trajectories that lead to first union and exit from education.
In particular, we assume that entry into first union triggers an early end of education (section
2.1), and conversely, that educational enrolment delays the transition to first union (section 2.2).
Moreover, we assume that there might exist unobservable characteristics that simultaneously
affect both processes, and that it is necessary to control  for them in order to get an unbiased
picture on the mutual relationship (section 2.3).3
2.1 The effect of  education on union formation
An important issue, in terms of the interpretation of the effects of  education on union formation,
is the different impact of enrolment and actual attained level. The literature has indeed shown
that differentiated treatment of these effects  is crucial, both in terms of occurrence, as well as the
timing of a union.
The empirical evidence showing that educational enrolment tends to delay the formation of
the first union is substantial (Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999; Hoem, 1986; Blossfeld and Huinink,
1991; Goldscheider and Waite, 1986). Education influences an individual’s ability to enter a
stable union in different ways. First, when attending school or university, individuals are
normally not financially independent, and to a large extent they have to rely on their family’s
financial support. Consequently, they do not have the resources to cover the costs  incurred by
the formation of a household.
On the other hand, Blossfeld and Huinink state that “there exist normative expectations in
society that young people who attend school are ‘not at risk’ of entering marriage or
parenthood” (1991). As they argue, the postponement of unions is related to school enrolment,
which in turn is driven by the existence of social norms. Such “sequencing” norms concern the
incompatibility of educational and marital or cohabitation  roles. Indeed, education is considered
a youth role, while marriage is associated with an adult role. Marini (1984) argues for instance,
that the presence of sequencing norms generates a preference for union formation taking place
after the educational process is finished. Furthermore, unions should take place after the young
individual has ensured a secure position in the labour market, and has achieved a stable
economic position (Oppenheimer, 1988).
While the individual is enrolled in the educational system, it is not clear to what extent he or
she is able to enter adult roles. This kind of uncertainty affects the mating process. For instance,
it is difficult to predict the expected quality of a match that is formed at this life stage. Many of
the “adult” characteristics are still not observable and not easily predictable. A confirmation of
this comes from the evidence that school enrolment affects the timing of marriage in a much
stronger way than with respect to the formation of consensual unions (Thornton et al., 1995;
Clarkberg, 1999). This is related to the fact that cohabitation generally involves a lower
commitment than marriage, and that the opportunity costs of cohabitation may be lower than
those of marriage (Oppenheimer, 1994).
It is reasonable to assume that  education impacts men’s and women’s union formation
processes in the same way, because it represents a barrier to the psychological, social and
economical transition to adulthood for both genders. The effect of the educational level however
can be subject to gender differences. In reality, prolonged school enrolment is associated with
high levels of education,  which in turn provide the means to get a stable occupational position4
quickly, once the individual has entered the labour market (Oppenheimer, 1988). The improved
opportunities for economic success and self-realisation can affect women’s and men’s interest
for union formation in different ways.
For instance, men with a higher educational level and better socio-economic position are
more attractive in the marriage market. Consequently they will receive a higher rate of marriage
offers, which makes it easier for them to find a high quality partner. Furthermore, a consequence
of their strong economic position is that they are in a better position to afford the costly venture
of setting up their own family. Women with high educational levels may also be considered as
more attractive in the marriage market. But it is clear that their strong economic position makes
them value the potential benefit of  marriage as lower, compared to women with lower levels of
education. Although the increased investments in human capital represent a means of
establishing their economic position, it also means that women perceive a high cost in the form
of having to spend their time on household intensive activities such as child rearing (Becker,
1973; Becker, 1991, ch.II; Oppenheimer, 1988). Therefore, in a social context where women
show increasing interest in human capital accumulation and attachments to the labour market,
one is likely to expect a postponement of marriages or consensual unions or even a reduction in
their frequencies.
Naturally, the educational level will also represent an individual’s characteristic, affecting the
mating process itself. Indeed, a partner's educational level is considered a complementary trait
that will reinforce the quality of the union. The more similar  educational levels are, the better
the quality of the union (Becker, 1973). Empirical evidence suggests that highly educated
women tend to marry men with the same or higher levels of education, while men tend to marry
women  with the same or lower levels (Gonzalez, 2000). As women increase their educational
level, this mating pattern will be more difficult, possibly lowering their marriage rates.
2.2  The effect of first union formation on the termination of education
Many studies have shown that the adoption of family behaviours typical of adult ages leads to a
higher risk of leaving the educational system. For example it has been found that forming a
union (Davis and Bumpass; 1976; McLaughlin et al., 1986) or having a child (Waite and Moore,
1978; Marini, 1984b; Upchurch and McCarthy, 1990) induce early drop out from school. Some
studies show that there are differences among genders as to how union formation affects
educational advancement. In this regard, the evidence suggests that union formation has  a higher
impact on women than on men (Marini, 1978; Alexander and Reilly, 1981; Teachman and
Polonko, 1988).5
 We have argued that the presence of sequencing norms, economic uncertainty among young
adults, as well as women’s opportunity costs are important in explaining the reduced probability
of union formation while  being enrolled in the educational system. The same arguments can be
used in order to understand the effect of first union formation on educational enrolment.
For instance, marriage prior to the completion of formal education generally violates the
common sequencing norms (Marini, 1984). If a union is formed before marriage, partners will
feel, in particular, the pressure of social norms reflecting the incompatibility between  full time
educational enrolment and union formation (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Thornton et al., 1995).
Consequently, once in a union, they can decide to accelerate their transition from the educational
system to the labour market. Therefore, they are likely to end education quicker than if they were
not in a union.
On the other hand, people who start a union while studying may possibly be highly family-
oriented. We can assume that family values are likely to cause an individual to break the social
norms characterising the relationship between union formation and schooling. Therefore, once
they have started forming a household, they will probably desire to quickly experience other
transitions to adult roles by leaving the education system and entering the labour market.
The entry into the labour market represents an important step in the union formation process.
In fact, union formation is a costly process. Therefore, economic needs, as well as the desire to
reach a certain quality of life, could induce people to leave the education system in order to
acquire a stable economic position. Such a need can be stronger for men than for women given
that  men’s economic positions have a stronger effect on union formation and its timing
(Oppenheimer, 1988).
Finally, if it is true that gender specialisation in family activities maximises the gain from
marriage (Becker, 1973; Becker, 1991, ch.II), then both men and women benefit from dropping
out of school after having entered a union, but for different reasons. Men would be better off
specialising in market activities, while women would be better off specialising in household
work. In both cases, after having established their own family, both men and women benefit
from leaving the education system and from specialising in other activities.
2.3 Common factors affecting the timing of union formation and the length of education
We have argued that union formation and education are processes that influence each other. The
roles of 'partner' (especially husband or wife) and of 'student', being hardly compatible, usually
imply that transitions in one trajectory trigger transitions in another trajectory. Indeed, the
enrolment in education has been shown to reduce rates of entry into union, while entry into union6
triggers an end of education. This means that individual choices about one process also influence
his or her choices about the other.
We have already underlined the importance of social norms in determining individual
behaviour. But even if every social environment has its set of norms that are supposed to be the
same for everybody, each individual still develops his or her own value orientation, tastes and his
or her own goals, through which he or she realises his or her own well-being. Empirical studies
have shown the existence of selection effects: Individual value orientations are predictors of the
occurrence of events (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1995; Lesthaeghe
and Vanderhoeft, 1997).
Concerning family formation and investment in family life, value orientations will affect
behaviour in a predictable way. Highly family-oriented individuals tend to opt for educational
and job careers that allow them to form a family quickly (including a union). In contrast, people
who are highly career-oriented tend to place emphasis on educational and job careers that are less
likely to leave room for early family formation. Thus, they are less likely to enter a union
compared to more traditionally oriented people, and they also behave in a more individualistic
way once in a union (Jansen and Kalmijn, 2002).
Therefore, value orientation (usually unobserved in the type of surveys now available)
influences  the decision making processes of individuals and this should be taken into account in
order to achieve unbiased results when analysing the reciprocal impact of individual processes.
Thus controlling for unobservable characteristics is necessary when direct measures of individual
characteristics such as value orientations are not available.
Using an instrumental variable approach, Sander showed in 1992 that education is
endogenous to family decisions such as marriage and divorce, and that educational enrolment
must therefore be modelled as an endogenous variable when estimating the  risk of getting
married. If this endogeneity is ignored, the negative effect of education upon marriage is
underestimated.
Other studies using simultaneous modelling strategies also demonstrate the endogeneity
issue. Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) present a model in which education and age at marriage
are two processes dependent on the labour and marriage market as well as on unobservable
individual characteristics that are consequently represented through a random heterogeneity term.
Finally, a mating function is estimated as being dependent on the other two processes and on
individual unobserved characteristics. The empirical application of this model to Philippine data
shows that “schooling, marital search and spouse selection are endogenous variables influenced
directly or indirectly by the total resources of parents, endowed traits of offspring, the cost of
schooling, and marriage market conditions”.
Lillard and colleagues (Lillard et al., 1994; Upchurch et al., 2001) assume that education and
family formation behaviours are related in two main ways. Firstly there are direct cross effects.7
For instance, school enrolment reduces economic independence and consequently the capacity of
getting married, while being married could increase the cost of continuing one’s education (as
argued in the previous two sections). Secondly, the allocation of time between schooling and
family formation is driven by individual preferences for both kinds of activities, and for their
future consequences. The authors find a negative (significant) correlation between marriage
formation and educational enrolment. Therefore the same unobservable influence both marriage
and education processes but in opposite directions. On the one hand, getting married reduces the
likelihood of advancing one’s education at all levels, apart from marriage during high school. On
the other hand, the probability of getting married increases when leaving school. Conditioning on
age, the increase of the risk does not vary much with completed educational level. This shows
that a higher propensity toward family formation results in lower investments in human capital,
and vice versa.
3.  Schooling and union formation in Italy and Spain
This paper aims not only at studying the mutual  relationship between first union formation and
the exit from education processes, but also aims at re-interpreting this relationship once
endogeneity is taken into account. Conversely, we are not particularly interested in the potential
country specific impact of socio-cultural and institutional characteristics on the processes under
study, and on their relations. Therefore, we develop the analysis for two “similar” countries, and
we use not a comparative but a “confirmative” approach. In this way, results obtained in the two
countries reinforce each other. Italy and Spain represent two countries particularly well adapted
for this purpose.
Italy and Spain represent the prototypes of the so called “Mediterranean” or “southern
European” societies. On the one hand, Italy and Spain are characterised by strong similarities in
welfare systems and institutional settings, which  rely mostly on the family (Esping-Andersen,
1999). Reher (1998) stresses the strength of family ties in such countries, in contrast with much
weaker ties in other northern European countries. On the other hand, they are characterised by
similar socio-demographic patterns that involve all the family formation processes such as  the so
called  “latest-late” transition to adulthood (Billari et al., forthcoming), as well as similar
participation in labour force and education systems (De Sandre et al., 2000; Delgado and Castro
Martin, 1999; Eurostat, 1997; Eurostat, 2000).
Regarding the processes we are interested in, Italy and Spain constitute a particularly
interesting context for studying the relationship between union formation and education. In both
countries, a massive expansion of women participating in education has been observed, as we8
will discuss in the following sections. At the same time, unions have been significantly
postponed, and not compensated for  the increased popularity of cohabitation.
Here we discuss the results in the literature for Italy and Spain in turn.
3.1 Italy
Italy has been characterised by an increase in  the general level of education  in  the population
over the past  decades. In 1951 only 5 per cent of men, and 3 per cent of women, in the total
population had a secondary or post secondary level of education. In 1991 this had increased  to
24 and 22 per cent respectively (De Sandre et al., 2000). On the one hand, this trend can be seen
as the consequence of the increased age for compulsory education, fixed by law at 14 years in
1968. On the other hand, criteria for university entrance were eased in 1969, and in the following
years the number of regional universities was expanded, making it easier to attend higher
education (Ongaro, 2001). Especially women increased their participation in the educational
system. In fact, by 1988 more women than men participated in higher education. In 1995, 52 per
cent of students in higher education were women (Eurostat, 2000).
In this context of educational and social transformation, which sees women increasingly
active and emancipated and assuming roles and lifestyles more similar to those of men,
nuptiality trends have also changed. First marriages in Italy have been characterised by a decline
of the first marriage rate from 78 per cent in 1990 to 60 per cent in 1997. At the same time, the
mean age at first marriage increased for both genders from 27.1 in 1980 to 30.0 in 1998 for men
and from 23.9 in 1980 to 27.1 in 1998 for women (Eurostat, 1997). Such trends are even more
significant when taking into account that the decrease and postponement of marriages are not
compensated by the diffusion of alternative forms of unions, such as cohabitation, that have been
spreading substantially in other countries (Sabbadini, 1997).
Some empirical analyses examined the determinants of the Italian marriage model. Having a
job, and consequently being economically independent, speeds up union formation for men. For
women, however, having a job seems to have the opposite effect (Ongaro, 2001). Individuals
with a high level of education marry less and later, and this is the case for both women and men
(Castiglioni, 1999). In particular for women, it has been shown that both schooling enrolment
and the level of education are associated with the postponement of  marriage. Therefore the
increase of the female educational level would be one of the causes of the postponement of
marriage in Italy. This seems to be mainly associated with delays in the transition to adulthood
but only as a consequence of the postponement of marriage (Blossfeld and De Rose, 1992).
Indeed, Italy is one of the countries where young people stay longer in their family of origin and9
when they leave home, it is usually simultaneous to the entry into a marriage or consensual union
(De Sandre, 1997; Billari and Ongaro, 1999).
Value orientations have been indicated as determinants of the postponement of first unions,
although existing surveys do not allow for the identification  of the issue responsible. Indeed,
women who have a less traditional value orientation, who believe that marriage is an old
fashioned institution and that out-of-wedlock births are acceptable, marry late or less frequently.
For men however the level of traditionalism seems not to have any effect. Moreover, individual
preference for high levels of consumption is associated with lower risk of entry into marriage,
and this is true for both men and women (Castiglioni, 1999). It is worth noting that these results
on the effects of individual value orientation and attitudes can be biased. Indeed, individual value
orientation is defined according to information collected after the events took place. Therefore it
is not possible to establish the causal relationship between current value orientations and
previous life experiences. In other words, individuals who have experienced unsatisfying unions
are less likely to be family oriented at the moment of the interview. In this case the actual value
orientation would be based on  previous life experiences, and it would be incorrect to use actual
value orientations to explain previous behaviours. Consequently there is a need for an alternative
mechanism to control for the effects of these unobserved characteristics. The approach we
propose in this paper is to model these characteristics as random unobserved heterogeneity terms.
Finally, marriage timing in Italy is also influenced by social norms. Indeed, it has been
shown that there is a high level of perception and of internalisation of the “proper age” to marry.
Also norms on age limits are widely spread in the population, particularly for what concerns a
lower limit for marriage (that is also imposed by law) (Billari and Micheli, 2001).
3.2 Spain
During the lasts decades, Spain has experienced many constitutional, social and economic
transformations. The reform of the Civil Code in 1981 is particularly relevant, and was
introduced in order to adapt the Civil Code to the Constitution of 1978. Before the reforms took
place, the concept of family was based, by definition, on masculine authority and women’s
dependence. “Marriage was conceived as a sacrament with civil and administrative effects,
which justified differences between children born in and out of marriage” (Tobio, 2001).
Divorce was only legalised in 1981. According to the new constitution, women and men have the
same rights in marriage and all children are legally equal, independently of the marital status of
their parents. Therefore married and unmarried parents have the same obligations towards their
children. This reform has been the basis for the adoption of a more European trend in Spain,
narrowing gender roles, increasing the emancipation of women and their participation in the10
labour market, and for allowing new forms of union such as cohabitation and out of wedlock
childbirth.
During the second half of the 1900’s, the Spanish educational system was transformed,
providing a higher level of education for both women and men, resulting in a sharp reduction of
illiteracy. “The steady improvement in the access to longer and better schooling has brought
about a sizeable durational gap among adjacent generations. Furthermore, not only have women
in recent years matched men in higher education enrolments, they have even slightly surpassed
them” (Delgado and Castro Martin, 1999). Indeed, the percentage of women in higher education
is as high as 53 in 1996.
In the new socio-economic context, marriage patterns have changed as well. The last decades
have been characterised by a postponement of first union (Castro Martin, 1993; Baizan, 2001;
Tobio, 2001). The age at first marriage increased during the last years from 23.5 in 1980 to 27.4
in 1998 for women, and from 25.9 in 1980 to 29.4 in 1998 for men (Eurostat, 1997). The decline
of marriage rates and the postponement of first marriage, as observed in other European
countries, does not correspond to an equivalent increase in cohabitation. Indeed, if in other
countries cohabitations compensate for the lack of marriages, this has not taken place  in Spain
nor Italy, where consensual unions are still relatively rare.
Spain, as Italy, is a country characterised by very late transition to adulthood: late age at
leaving school, late age at first job and late age at leaving home (Baizan, 2001). Late age at
leaving school is attributable to prolonged education, and an increase in educational facilities  at
different levels (Tobio, 2001). Empirical analyses demonstrate the importance of education in
determining the late age at first marriage. This is true especially for women, where “college
education leads to marriage postponement, but it does not reduce the likelihood of eventual
marriage after school completion” (Castro Martin, 1993). As for men , individuals in secondary
education have a lower risk of entering marriage than those with primary or university education.
High levels of individual income are associated with earlier age at marriage (Baizan, 2001).
The traditional and conservative behaviour of young people in Spain seems to be in contrast
to  the high level of tolerance they have for non-traditional behaviours. Indeed, the majority of
young Spaniards favours different kinds of unions, like cohabitation, or homosexual
partnerships, as well as non-marital childbirth (Tobio, 2001).11
4.  Data and methods
4.1 The European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
Our analyses will be developed using data from the “European Community Household Panel”
(ECHP). This is a multi-dimensional and multi-purpose survey centrally designed and co-
ordinated by the Statistical Office of the European Community (EUROSTAT). It is carried out
by National Data Collection Units (NDU), that is the national institutes of statistics or other
public bodies or private organisation. In Italy and Spain the national institutes, ISTAT and INE
respectively, are responsible for the survey. The ECHP has been carried out from 1994 to 2002.
For the present analyses, data  from 1994 to 1998 are used (Eurostat, 2001).
The survey is representative of the population of the EU countries, at the household and at
the individual level, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. The target population is that of
private households, defined as “sharing the same dwelling” and having “common living
arrangements”. Some information is collected about the household, such as the composition of
the household, the financial situation and certain characteristics of the accommodation.
Moreover, all members of each household, if older than 16 years, are personally interviewed
every year. They are followed up when they leave their original household and form a new one
(Istat, 2001). Individuals entering a sample household after the first wave are interviewed as
well. Information at the individual level concerns general demographic characteristics,
employment, unemployment, education and training careers, income and health status, migration
trajectory and certain levels of satisfaction.
The survey provides standardised information for both Italy and Spain (and obviously the
other countries that participate in the project), about the different demographic and socio-
economic trajectories of the individuals interviewed. Therefore the ECHP represents a valid
instrument with which to analyse the educational career and union formation processes, allowing
for conditioning on individual and household characteristics in a comparative framework.
Selected for the analysis are those who, at the first interview, have never been married,  are
not in a consensual union, are studying  and living in the household of origin. In this way the
analyses are developed on individuals who, during the period of observation, are concurrently
exposed to the risks of entering a union and of ending education. This preliminary condition
allows for a simultaneous modelling of the two processes; controlling for the unobservable
characteristics that may concurrently influence the exit from education and the entry into union.
Finally, the choice to select only individuals who  at the time of the first interview were living
with their parents is based on the evidence that very few individuals were not in this situation.
Hence, except in a  few cases, it was possible to introduce characteristics of the family of origin12
into the models. It will be shown later (section 5.2) that household characteristics are useful for
the  interpretation of the processes, and therefore such assumption finds empirical justification.
For the individuals we selected we reconstructed educational careers according to the
monthly calendar of activities available in the ECHP. The definitive exit from education has
been defined as  being out of the educational system for at least  5 months. For men, military
service has been controlled for: individuals who were in education before and after military
service were considered continuously enrolled in education. This choice is based on the fact that
military service was compulsory in Italy and Spain during the years of the survey, and therefore
the exit from education for this reason is not determined as a voluntary decision to stop studying.
We also reconstructed the date of the entry into first union. We do not distinguish between
first marriage and consensual union because the entries into cohabitation were too few to allow
for modelling the two kinds of union separately. Furthermore, when the individual enters a
consensual union, it is not possible to know if it is the first one or not. Nevertheless, all
consensual unions observed are assumed to be first unions. It is not too unlikely that individuals
still in education are experiencing the first union and not the second or the third one. Thus the
results reported in this paper are estimated on a sub-sample of 1347 Italians and 1136 Spaniards
who, in the period of observation, experienced 85 and 62 events of “first union” respectively
(Tab. 1).
4.2 Hazard model and simultaneous modelling
We have argued that union formation and exit from the education system are processes that
influence each other. Therefore, when modelling union formation, it is important to take into
account the educational career, and vice versa. Also, the eventual existence of unobservable
factors that could influence both processes simultaneously has been underlined, and therefore
must be taken into account.
The literature that deals with modelling different interrelated trajectories, like union
formation and educational careers, constitutes a vivid debate about the appropriate way of
modelling these processes. The “causal” approach suggests that it is sufficient to model each
process separately, conditioning on past trajectories of each process (Blossfeld and Rohwer,
1995). A contrasting approach stresses the importance of modelling the processes simultaneously
as in a system, allowing for the correlation among the heterogeneity terms of each process
(Lillard, 1993). Such heterogeneity, it is claimed, represents the set of unobservable individual
characteristics that affects individual choices, and this can be interpreted in terms of attitudes and
value orientations. In this paper both approaches will be used in order to find the best
descriptions of both processes and their interrelationship.13
Thus in the first step each process is modelled through a hazard equation, conditioning on
household and individual covariates as well as on the other process.
In particular, first union formation is modelled as follows.
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where:
-  t stands for the age of the individual minus 16 which is the minimum age at interview in the
ECHP, and it represents the minimum age at the exposure to experience the event of interest
-  ) (t h
u denotes the hazard of entry into first union (starting at age 16)
-  ) (t Au denotes the effect of age. It is represented by a linear spline with a knot at 24 years
-  ) ( 1 t X is a vector of household and individual covariates measured at the first wave, at which
time the respondent has age t1. They include sex, educational level, being a member of a club
such as a sport or entertainment club, a local or neighbourhood group, a party etc., and level
of satisfaction with the amount of leisure time.
-  ) ( 1 t I  denotes household income at age t1. It is represented by  a linear spline with a knot at
the mean per capita income in the sample. It is computed as the household income divided
by the equivalised size of the household (OECD scale). It is thus expressed in purchasing
power parities.
-  ) (t E is the time dependent covariate that expresses whether the individual has left the
educational system at time t
Exit form the educational system is modelled as follows.
) ( ) ( ) ( ln 1
’
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where:
-  t stands for the age of the individual (minus 16).
-  ) (t h
e denotes the hazard of the exit from the educational system (starting at age 16)
-  ) (t Ae denotes the effect of age. It is represented by a linear spline with knots at 19 and 25
years (about when individuals are supposed to leave high school and university,
respectively).
-  ) ( 1 t Z is a vector of household and individual covariates measured at the first wave, at which
time the respondent has age t1. They include household income, the father’s educational14
level, the level of satisfaction with studying and the number of individuals per room in the
home (kitchen excluded).
In a second model, a heterogeneity term is added to each process: 
u ε  for union formation
and 
e ε  for exit from education. Each term represents unobserved characteristics at the individual
level




e σ  respectively.
Since we are interested in the possible correlation between the unobservable characteristics
that affect the two processes, we fix the variance
2 of each process and then estimate the
correlation among the heterogeneity terms.
The heterogeneity terms are assumed to be time-constant. Such an assumption is not


















































The models are estimated at maximum likelihood, using the aML software package (Lillard
and Panis, 2000). In order to evaluate the quality of the models the BIC (Bayesian Information
Criterion) will be used (Raftery, 1995), because it allows for comparison among non-nested
models. The lower is its value, the better is the model. Moreover, this indicator is more suitable
than ln-likelihood when the processes we are modelling are characterised by the occurrence of
just few events.
                                                
1 Some of our respondents belong to the same household. Therefore, it can be argued that these
observations are not independent, but that there should be a possible correlation among those in the same
family. In order to check such a hypothesis, a multilevel model that takes into account the hierarchy in the
data has been estimated, with the heterogeneity term representing the variability at the household level.
These results confirmed that the observations could indeed be considered independent. Therefore, the
models presented are estimated at an individual level.
2 Given that we are modelling single spell processes, and that we do not include any time-varying
explanatory variable in the models, we do not have enough information to directly estimate the variance
terms. Therefore, we fix the variance terms at different values, and we notice that the estimates of the
correlation is stable. Indeed, the estimate of the correlation does not vary depending on the values of the
variance terms.15
4.3 Explanatory variables
In order to explain the processes of first union formation and exit from education, the effect of
several explanatory variables is tested. In particular, we will focus on the effect of some
individual characteristics and some household characteristics on the risk of experiences the two
events under examination. Concerning exit from education, because of lack of information, we
are not able to distinguish between the completion of an education period (by attaining a
vocational certificate or degree) and drop out of education (by not attaining such a result).
Although the difference between these two ways of leaving the educational system is important
in shaping the process, we have to disregard this aspect. Thus we discuss the effect of the
possible explanatory variables on the duration of school enrolment, not referring to the possible
reason of its end.
First, concerning individual characteristics, the effect of age and sex is controlled for.
Indeed, both processes are supposed to be highly dependent on age. Trends of marriage by age
are well defined both in Italy and Spain, by a non-monotonic pattern: The risk of entering a
union rises with age, reaches a peak, and then falls (Castiglioni, 1999; Righi, 1997; Miret-
Gamundi, 1997). Also school enrolment is dependent on age, given that in both countries a
minimum age, below which everyone must go to school, is defined by law.  Concerning gender
differences, we expect that union formation is highly differentiated by sex, with men entering the
first union later (Castiglioni, 1999; Righi, 1997; Miret-Gamundi, 1997). The literature has shown
that, through and increasing participation of women in the educational system, nowadays the
process of exiting from education occurs in a similar shape for both genders (Ongaro, 2001;
Delgado and Castro Martin, 1999; Eurostat, 1997).
The other individual characteristics taken into account are levels of satisfaction, in particular
the level of satisfaction with studying, with the financial situation, with the housing situation and
with the amount of leisure time. The literature recognises an important role of satisfaction levels
with several aspects of life. Such variables have been investigated both in terms of dependent
variables and of independent variables.  Concerning the relationship between marital status and
satisfaction, the former is usually considered as a cause of the latter, married individuals being
more satisfied than those in the other civil status (Stack and Eshleman, 1998 Ryan, 1981;
Broman; 1988).
As an independent variable, satisfaction is important in determining decision making
processes about migration (Speare, 1974; Morris et al., 1976), job change (Akerlof et al., 1988;
Freeman, 1978), education drop-out (Bean, 1980; Spady, 1970; Tinto, 1975) and so on. In
particular, when the theory was applied to residential mobility it was discovered that highly
satisfied individuals are not likely to move, while beyond a certain threshold of dissatisfaction
individuals desire to change their residential situation, and only at a very high level of16
dissatisfaction would  they actually move (Speare, 1974; Morris et al., 1976; Landale and Guest,
1985). Similarly, we assume that those individuals who are highly satisfied with the different
aspects of their current situation are less likely to experience a desire to  change their current
situation, as is the case at the establishment of the first union. In particular, those who are
satisfied with studying might be motivated to invest more in the educational career, and postpone
the first union. Those who are satisfied with their financial and housing situation (which
concerns the family of origin) might postpone leaving home until they are able to acquire their
own housing and financial situation at the same level of satisfaction as the original one. Those
who are satisfied with the amount of leisure time in their lives might be less motivated to start
assuming the responsibilities implied by household formation. The effect of club membership
has also been controlled for, because we assume that those individuals who are members of a
club have a wider social network, and it might be easier for them to find a partner. Therefore,
they are likely to enter a union earlier.
The relation between satisfaction and drop-out from education has already been shown in the
past (Bean, 1980; Bean, 1983; Bean, 1985; Spady, 1970; Tinto, 1975). We assume that higher
levels of satisfaction are associated with prolonged school enrolment. In particular, we expect the
level of satisfaction with studying to have a high impact on the individual decision to exit from
the educational system. Those who are more satisfied are likely to invest more in their
educational career, while those who are not satisfied are more likely to quit the educational
system in order to find a way of self-realisation in an alternative activity.
We assume that the transitions to first union and to education completion are highly
influenced by some characteristics of the family of origin (Alwin and Thornton, 1984; Ermisch
and Francesconi, 2000), because in Italy and Spain decisions about these two processes are
developed while the individual is still living with the parents (Miret-Gamundi, 1997; Ongaro,
2001). Therefore, parents can influence the decision process through psychological, motivational
and financial support. In particular we control for the effect of the household income, of the
parents’ educational level, and of the number of individuals per room in the home, considered as
a proxy of the quality of life in the household.
We expect that household income effect the timing of union formation in two possible ways.
On the one hand, we might assume that household income delays the entry into marriage
(Goldsheider and Waite, 1986; Avery et al., 1992). We argue that individuals decide to enter into
first union when they are able to form a new household as wealthy as the one they came from
(Crimmins et al., 1991; Easterlin, 1987: Ch-2). This implies that people living in richer
households will take longer to get sufficient financial resources to form a new wealthy
household. Those individuals who are living  in a poorer household might be more motivated to
be independent and enter the first union, because the disadvantages of leaving the household of
origin would be lower. When considering household income as a proxy of family social class,17
empirical evidence shows that women belonging to families of lower class marry early
(Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991).
On the other hand, individuals highly family oriented and living in wealthy households
might rely on their parents’ financial support in order to form a new household. This would
imply that individuals belonging to richer households are more likely to enter a union earlier
(Baizan, 2001).
Concerning the effect of income on school enrolment, we expect that individuals living in
richer households are likely to prolong their educational enrolment, because they can rely on
financial support from  their parents (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000). In the literature a positive
relationship has been shown between family social status and educational level. It interprets
social status as being a proxy for the resources available to invest in the education of children
(Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Alwin and Thonton, 1984). If we measure directly the amount of
resources per individual in the household, we can expect that the higher the amount of such
resources, the longer is the enrolment in school.
The parental level of education, if high, might delay the entry into first union and the exit
from the educational system for students, because highly educated parents might favour
investing more in their sons' and daughters' educational careers, and they might also motivate
their daughters and sons to invest more in their own educational careers (Ermisch and
Francesconi, 2000; Behrman et al., 1999; Billari and Ongaro, 1999; Goldsheider and Waite,
1986). Therefore, students might also delay entry into a union because they are involved in a
longer education process.
Finally, the number of persons per room is controlled for. Traditionally, the effect of family
size is analysed. There exists empirical evidence showing that individuals living in large
households end their educational career earlier (Alwin and Thornton, 1984; Sander, 1991), enter
the first union earlier (Billari and Ongaro, 1999), or leave the parental home earlier (Ongaro,
2001). This relationship might be interpreted in terms of resources available per individual in the
household. Given that we measure such a variable directly, we use family size relative to the
number of rooms existing at home in order to propose a measure of how much “space” each
individual has. We expect that overcrowded accommodations might push young individuals out
of the households of origin, in order to gain more space and independence. Thus we expect that
individuals who are living in accommodations where the number of persons per room is high are
more likely to end the educational process in order to enter the labour market and quickly acquire
the economic independence they need to leave home. Similarly we expect, that such individuals
are also more likely to enter a union early because the costs of establishing a new  home are
lower. Such an explanatory variable is not present in the literature.18
5.  Results
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate parameter estimates for Italy and Spain respectively. In both cases, we
estimate four different models. In model A only individual specific variables are included. In
model B characteristics of the family of origin are added. Finally, in model C and D we include
the same covariates used in model A and B respectively, but we add the (potentially) correlated
heterogeneity terms. The value of the BIC test is included in order to give a measure of quality
to the models.
These four models have been selected for two main reasons. Firstly, we would like to
estimate the different effects of individual specific characteristics and of household specific
characteristics. Secondly, we would like to test the presence of correlated unobserved
characteristics once observed characteristics are taken into account. In sections 5.1 and 5.2 the
Italian results are discussed first, and then we compare the Spanish estimates. In section 5.3 the
results of simultaneous modelling are discussed at the same time for both countries. Finally in
section 5.4 models according to gender are shown.
5.1 The effect of individual specific characteristics
In order to model entry into first union (Table 2, model A) we take into account the following
individual characteristics: age, sex, highest level of education completed at the first interview,
exit from the educational system, level of satisfaction with the amount of leisure time, and club
membership.
Respondents are aged 17-35. The parameters of the age are significantly positive. Therefore,
the higher the age, the higher the probability of entry into first union. Men enter a union
significantly later than women, as already shown in the literature (Righi, 1997; Castiglioni, 1999;
De Sandre et al., 2000). A high level of completed education results in a high probability of
union formation. Human capital investment seems not to delay or prevent the process of union
formation (Becker, 1991, supplement to ch.II) but to accelerate it. Possibly the advantages
associated with higher educational levels when they enter the labour market, or higher self
esteem in their ability to reach a good economic position quickly, can explain why respondents
married earlier (Oppenheimer, 1988). Moreover, such a result is consistent with the findings of
Marini (1984c), who showed that individuals who attain high levels of education are more likely
to enter adult roles prior the completion of education because a protracted course of education
increases the probability that adult roles will be entered before the completion of schooling.
Thus, individuals with a higher level of education are more likely to enter a union even if their
education is not finished.19
Exiting from the educational system (Table 2, model A) has a strong and significant effect
on the process of first union formation. Indeed the probability of entering a union is much higher
when the individual has finished education (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Blossfeld and De
Rose, 1992). The assumption that a standard sequence between the two events is common seems
to be supported by these results.
The level of satisfaction with leisure time has an insignificant and almost neutral effect. Club
membership, although insignificant, increases the probability of entering a union, possibly
because of a larger social network, which  can enhance the mating process. The effects of other
variables, such as the level of financial satisfaction  and the housing situation have been tested,
but found to be insignificant in the two countries. Thus they have been excluded from the model.
Concerning exit from education, the covariates used in the model are age, sex and the level
of satisfaction with  the main activity, which in this case is education itself. According to age
there is a clear path; rates of exit from the educational system are higher between the ages of 16
and 19 and after 25. That is to say, people are more likely to end education during high school
and after the university degree. Once they have finished high school and decided to attend
university, they have a lower probability to end education.
It is important to notice that there are no significant gender differences in the process,
suggesting that currently there is close similarity between men’s and women’s participation in
the educational system (Eurostat, 1997).
Individuals who are highly satisfied with the time spent studying are less likely to end
education. Therefore individual attitudes play an important role, beyond other practical or
economic reasons that could cause people to start working instead of going on studying. Such a
variable may also be considered as a proxy for the quality of their results in school. Indeed,
individuals who achieve better results studying are more likely to be satisfied with their activity.
Therefore, we can assume that those who get better results prolong their educational career.
The effect of entry into union on this process has been examined. However, the low number
of first union events during education precludes any estimation to this effect. This result
confirms that in Italy almost nobody marries if the educational career is not completed.
The results obtained for Spain are similar to those just shown for Italy.
Concerning union formation (Table 3, model A), exit from education increases the
probability of entering a union even more so in Spain than in Italy. Also gender differences in the
timing of union formation are more evident in Spain than in Italy, and again we see that men
form the first union later than women. The Spanish parameter of the educational level is similar
to the one estimated for Italy. Therefore, also Spanish  individuals with a higher educational
level are more likely to enter a union early. Club membership is not significant, whereas  the
level of satisfaction with the amount of leisure time plays an important role. Indeed, those who
are more satisfied marry much later. It is worth to underline that this covariate was not important20
in determining the process of union formation in Italy. This can be considered as a peculiarity of
the Spanish model, and a symbol of how Spanish attitudes and value orientation affect the timing
of union formation. Thus, leisure time is considered a commodity that somehow can be lost
when a union is formed, or a way of self-realisation that lowers the need for a stable and formal
relationship.
A trend suggests increased exit from the educational system with age after age 19. The level
of satisfaction for time spent studying delays the exit from the educational system. The effect of
the entry into first union cannot be estimated, suggesting that also Spaniards do not enter a union
before they have completed their educational career.
5.2 The effects of household specific characteristics
Several household characteristics have important effects on both processes (Table 2, model B).
Household income for instance has a significant effect on entry into union. The effect of the
covariate is represented through a linear spline with a node close to the mean level of the income
in the sample (Figure 1). If the income is lower than the mean, individuals are less likely to enter
a union. After the node point there is a higher probability of entering a union. Possibly, ,
individuals need to rely on financial support from home in order to bear the costs of forming a
new family while still being students . Other characteristics, such as  the educational level of
parents, the size of the family, or the quality of accommodation, do not influence the process of
union formation.
In contrast, the exit from the educational system is influenced by a higher number of
household characteristics. For instance, if the father is highly educated, the individual is likely to
delay the end of the educational career. Also the effect of the mother’s education, or of the mean
level of parents’ education, have been tested. But the father’s education appears to have the
clearest and strongest effect on the process. We will show later that this is true also for Spain.
This is not surprising in these cultures where the father traditionally plays the role of the head of
the household and where therefore many family decisions depend on him.
High household income, even if not significant, delays the exit from the educational system,
suggesting that wealthy households invest more resources to lengthen their children's education.
Finally, an indicator of the quality of life in the home has been constructed, dividing the
number of family components by the number of the rooms in the house  (excluding the kitchen).
The higher the density, the higher the probability of ending education. This result suggests that
when individuals do not have enough “space” in their family of origin, they end education,
probably because they feel a higher desire for independence. Still, being employed as opposed to21
being a student can be more useful in order to acquire the means to leave the family of origin and
be independent.
The values of the BIC for both models (Table 2, model A and B) show that the model is
significantly improved if household characteristics are included. Both processes, indeed,
contribute to the transition from childhood to adulthood, which is partly determined by the
family of origin.
Household characteristics affect the processes in Spain similarly to what is shown for Italy
(Table 3, model B). Household income, if higher than the mean, significantly increases the
probability of an individual entering a union, confirming that parental  financial support allows
individuals to enter a union earlier. In contrast, household income significantly decreases the
probability of leaving the educational system, showing that financial support also guarantees the
possibility of  prolonging the educational career.
Individuals who live in a household with a high number of people per room have a higher
rate of ending school. Finally, the father’s educational level, when high, delays the end of
schooling, but affects Spaniards to a lesser extent  than Italians.
In the case of Spain, the use of household characteristics does not improve the explanation of
the processes (Tab. 3, BIC for model A and B).
5.3 Simultaneous models
Models C and D (Table 2 and 3) show the estimates when the heterogeneity terms and the
correlation between them is included.
Firstly, in both countries there is a high and significant correlation between the unobserved
characteristics that influence the first union formation process and the end of the educational
career. This means that individuals who, for “any unobserved reason”, are likely to marry early,
are simultaneously likely to end school early. We suggest interpreting this feature in terms of
individuals’ value orientations and attitudes.
Family oriented individuals are more likely to complete their educational careers early
because in this way they can more easily enter other family roles such as being married and
being parents. Indeed, as discussed before, individuals may decide to end education in order to
achieve a stable economic position sooner and  (especially men), making the union formation
easier, or they can decide to specialise in household activities that increase the gain from
marriage (especially women). On the other hand  career-oriented individuals are likely to invest
more in their educational career first, and job career later, and they are less likely to leave room
for early union formation.22
Controlling for the endogeneity of the processes, the effect of educational career completion
on first union formation is reduced. In fact, the exit from education still strongly increases the
risk of entering a union, but much less so than what is observed when the two processes are
treated independently. In other words, if endogeneity is not controlled for, the effect of
educational enrolment is overestimated. This is true also for the effect of the educational level.
This implies that if first union and education career are not modelled simultaneously, the
estimates of the educational effects can be highly biased.
It is worth noting that the estimates of covariates and  correlation terms are also stable when
different values of the variance terms (
2
u σ and 
2
e σ ) are used (not documented here). As argued
in section 4.2 we use the BIC values for compare non-nested models. They show that controlling
for the endogeneity of the processes improves the model considerably (Table 2 and 3).
5.4 Gender differences
The results shown up to now suggest that in Italy and Spain union formation and the exit from
education affect each other in the same way, and that each process is influenced almost
identically  by the same set of covariates. This allows for a pooling of the Italian and Spanish
data-sets in order to model separately by gender, and to at the same time control for the existence
of gender differences in the effect of the covariates on union formation and the timing of exit
from education.
Table 4 shows the parameters of the models’ estimates for the two countries and the two
sexes together (model C and D), and for the two countries together but for women only (model
CW and DW). From the comparison between the first two and the last two models, the resulting
existence of gender differences can be outlined
3.
Models show that there are gender differences but no country differences in the timing of
first union formation: Men marry later than women in the same proportion in both countries. On
the other hand , there are no gender differences in the timing of exit from education, but there are
strong and significant differences between the two countries. Indeed, Spaniards exit from the
education system much earlier than Italians. This  could be partly due to the differences in the
education systems of the two countries. In fact in Spain finishing high school and university
should take place at an earlier age than in Italy.
Concerning the covariates’ effects on union formation, we notice that after leaving school
women face a greater risk of entering a union than men (Corijn, 2001). The educational level,
                                                
3 We are not able to estimate directly the models for men only, because the occurrence of too few events of
first union for men during the period of observation.23
has a lower (and less significant) impact on women, suggesting that high educational levels
improve men’s marriage chances  more than it does women’s. Finally, household income is less
significant in determining the timing of women’s union formation. This is probably the case
because the responsibility of supporting of the new household financially traditionally rests  on
men.
The effects of household characteristics on exit from education are not highly gender
differentiated. Income is less significant in determining the exit from education for women than
it is for men, while the number of individuals per room in the accommodation has a stronger
effect on women. This would imply that women suffer from the consequences of overcrowded
accommodation more than men.
Finally, it is worth underlining that those gender differences, that have been observed,
concern the significance and the intensity of the effect of the covariates, but never the sign of the
estimates. Therefore, we can conclude that there are no important gender differences in the way
the processes are influenced by other variables and in their mutual relations.
6.  Conclusions
In this paper, we have focused on the processes of first union formation and exit from education,
on their causal interrelationship, and on the existence of unobservable factors influencing both
processes simultaneously. The main assumption is that these two processes represent interrelated
trajectories in the course of an individual's life. Therefore, choices made in  one process limit the
freedom to choose  in others (Blossfeld and Huinink, 1991; Hoem, 1986; David and Bumpass,
1976; McLaughlin et al., 1986). Decision-making attributes are developed according to both
individual and household characteristics, given that both processes are collocated in the stage of
the life between childhood and adulthood, when the influence of the family of origin is still
important (Goldscheider and Waite, 1986; Alwin and Thornton, 1984; Ermisch and Francesconi,
2000). Moreover, we assume that there could be individual unobserved characteristics that
influence simultaneously entry into union and the end of education (Boulier and Rosenzweig,
1984; Sander, 1992; Lillard et al., 1994).
These processes are analysed in the particular cultural context of Italy and Spain, both of
which are characterised by an increasing postponement of the transition to adulthood (Ongaro,
2001; Baizan, 2001). Consequently, the dynamics of these two processes are particularly
relevant. Both countries are experiencing several economic and demographic trends in a similar
way (Delgado and Castro Martin, 1999; De Sandre et al., 2000). Therefore the assumption is that
the processes of union formation and exit from education, plus their mutual relations and
determinants are not dissimilar in Italy and Spain.24
Results show that both processes are influenced by individual and household characteristics.
In particular, first union is more likely to be formed when the individual has finished the
educational career, and has a high level of education. Also, club membership enhances the
chances of entering into the first union, while being satisfied with the amount of leisure time
delays the transition to married  status. People living in high income households are more likely
to marry. In the case of exit from education, it is postponed if the individual has a high level of
satisfaction with studying. Household characteristics affect this process more than the other
criteria. Indeed household income, the father’s education, and the quality of accommodation
effect the educational career. In particular, the higher the household income, and the higher the
father’s education, the longer a student stays enrolled. However , when the accommodation is
characterised by a high number of people per room, the individual is more likely to drop out
from school early.
Union formation is characterised by a strong gender difference in Italy and Spain, because
men marry significantly later than women. In contrast, educational careers appear not to be
differentiated by gender. Also the effect of the individual and household characteristics on the
processes are fairly  similar for both genders .
After showing that education affects union formation, a further analysis has been developed
in order to control for the unobservable characteristics that could potentially effect both
processes simultaneously. The processes certainly appear to be endogenous in the sense that they
are influenced in the same direction by unobserved individual characteristics which in this paper
are interpreted, , in terms of value orientations and attitudes. Family oriented individuals are
more likely to both enter the first union, and end education early. In contrast, individuals who
find a way of self-realisation in the educational career, are less likely to exit from the educational
system. They are also less likely to enter a union, possibly because they may try to invest more in
their professional careers, after having made high investments in their educational careers.
The endogeneity of the processes is also relevant because if it is not controlled for, the
effects of education enrolment and educational level on union formation are overestimated.
Therefore, when modelling union formation it is necessary to model education as an endogenous
process to achieve unbiased results.
Using this data set for these analyses represents certain novelties. In fact, data are recent and
rich in information about individual and household characteristics covering demographic, social,
and economic aspects. These are important when the dynamics and the interrelationships among
the different trajectories in individual lives are to be analysed. It is worthy indeed, to control for
how the direct environment (the household) surrounding the individual influences his or her
decision making process psychologically and practically. In addition, changes reflecting
household conditions and other aspects in individual lives  are collected simultaneously,
simplifying the interpretation of the causal relationship among different trajectories. Finally, data25
regarding levels of satisfaction that can strongly influence individual choices are collected
exactly while the process is taking place, therefore representing an important key for  the
interpretation of the decision making process itself.
On the other hand  these same data sets have some limitations. Indeed, only five annual
waves are available at the moment. This implies that individuals are observed over the course of
only four years, and only few events of “first union” and “end of education” can take place
during such a short period. This is true especially in Italy and Spain where the distribution of
such events is spread widely over a life span.
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Annex: extracting the data from the ECHP
In this paper we present the results of the simultaneous modelling of the processes of entry into
first union and definitive exit from the educational system, through a system of two continuos
hazard equations. Therefore, only those individuals who were in education, never married and
not in consensual union at the first interview are selected for the analysis. Individuals are
followed up during the four years under observation. If they are not interviewed in one of the
years of the survey, they are considered as censored from the last interview available onwards.
The dependent variables of the two hazard models are the time at first union and the time at
exit from education. The ECHP does not provide exact dates of when the entry into first union
and the definitive exit from the educational took place, and thus we had to reconstruct them. In
this section we provide a detailed description of the reconstruction of the dependent variables.26
a.  entry into first union
Firstly, individuals were selected who were never married and not in a consensual union at the
time of the first interview. Then, for those individuals who from one wave to the following
changed their marital status (from never married to married- PD005) or entered a consensual
union (PD007), the date of entry into union was reconstructed according to the available
information.
For married individuals the year of marriage is available (PD006), but not the month. In
order to know the month the marriage took place, we made some assumptions according to the
migration trajectory of the individual:
-  for individuals who moved out from the original household at the time of marriage, the
month the move to a new address occurred was assigned (HA001 and HA002).
When such information was missing, instead of reconstructing the exact date of entry into
union, the interval of time during which the event took place was reconstructed.
If the year of the marriage was before the year of the current interview, then the range of
such interval is between the date (month and year PG006 and PG007) of the previous
interview and December of the year of marriage. If the year of marriage is the same as that of
the current interview, then the range of the interval is between January of the year of
marriage and the date of the current interview (month and year). If also the year of marriage
is missing, then the range of the interval varies between the dates of the two contiguous
interviews.
-  for individuals who did not move out from the original household after the first marriage, the
month the spouse moved to his or her household was assigned (PIO_YYi and PIO_MMi). If
such information was missing, an interval in which the event took place was reconstructed,
as described above.
b.  definitive exit from education
The ECHP provides a calendar of monthly main activities during the year previous to the
interview (PC001-PC012). According to this  information, we selected individuals who were
studying (as their main activity) during the month of the interview. For these individuals we
know month by month whether they were studying or not. We assume that the exit from
education is definitive when the individual is out of the educational system for more than 5
months in a row. In this way, we consider as full time students those individuals who would
interrupt their studies for summer holidays or other such reasons that do no concern the free
choice to leave the education system. Nevertheless, there are some (few) cases in which27
individuals re-enter the educational system after having been away from it for more than 5
months. We disregard such entries because we assume that they are the result of a choice
determined by a mismatch between the individual’s expectations and the reality out of the
educational system. An example would be somebody who decided to stop studying in order to
start working. If he or she did  not find a job, he or she could be motivated to re-enter the
educational system.
Concerning men only, we made a further assumption for those involved in military service.
We assume that some individuals had to interrupt their studies not according to free choice, but
to participate in  military service, which was compulsory in both countries during the years for
which the survey is available. So those individuals who re-entered the educational system over a
period shorter than 5 months after military service was completed, are considered as
continuously in education.
The monthly calendar of activities provides detailed information until December of the year
previous to the last interview. Therefore, the participation in the education system in the period
between January of the year of the last interview and the month of the last interview must be
reconstructed according to other information. The individual is considered continuously in
education since January to the finishing month of the last educational course (PT006-PT011), if
the individual is not in education at the last interview. Otherwise, if the individual is still in
education at the interview, he or she is considered as continuously in education since January
until the month of the last interview.28
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Women 58 346 637
Men 27 347 710
Total 85 693 1347
Spain
Women 50 357 515
Men 12 281 621
Total 62 638 1136











Table 2: Results of models for Italy
Model A Model B Model C Model D
First Union par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e.
Constant -7.264 0.856 *** -6.662 0.897 *** -7.610 0.918 *** -6.938 0.959 ***
16-24 years old (linear spline) 0.445 0.119 *** 0.438 0.120 *** 0.424 0.127 *** 0.422 0.129 ***
More than 24 years old (linear spline) 0.142 0.039 *** 0.143 0.041 *** 0.194 0.049 *** 0.196 0.051 ***
Men -0.836 0.249 *** -0.803 0.251 *** -0.994 0.292 *** -0.992 0.297 ***
Exited from education 1.779 0.499 *** 1.754 0.499 *** 1.255 0.576 *** 1.255 0.575 ***
University degree 0.778 0.310 ** 0.785 0.313 ** 0.720 0.405 ** 0.724 0.422 *
Satisfaction with leisure time 0.012 0.089 0.009 0.092 -0.028 0.102 -0.042 0.107
Member of a club 0.351 0.259 0.344 0.262 0.467 0.312 * 0.460 0.318
Income lower than mean (linear spline) -0.120 0.059 ** -0.134 0.069 **
Income higher than mean (linear spline) 0.035 0.014 * 0.037 0.019
Out of Education
Constant -2.631 0.402 *** -2.812 0.433 *** -4.048 0.457 *** -4.411 0.516 ***
16-19 years old (linear spline) 0.528 0.141 *** 0.549 0.142 *** 0.999 0.158 *** 1.031 0.159 ***
19-25 years old (linear spline) -0.072 0.020 *** -0.067 0.020 *** -0.069 0.028 ** -0.057 0.028 **
More than 25 years old (linear spline) 0.172 0.016 *** 0.169 0.015 *** 0.267 0.032 *** 0.271 0.032 ***
Men 0.121 0.071 0.146 0.071 * 0.107 0.112 0.149 0.112
Satisfaction with studying -0.132 0.023 *** -0.121 0.023 *** -0.180 0.037 *** -0.157 0.037 ***
Income -0.012 0.009 -0.017 0.012
Father’s educational level -0.612 0.155 *** -0.858 0.215 ***
Persons per room 0.190 0.096 * 0.316 0.153 **
Sigma union 1.2 1.2
Sigma education 1.2 1.2
Rho 0.630 0.169 *** 0.645 0.175 ***
ln-L -3972.99 -3952.27 -3942.06 -3919.96
BIC -3180.56 -3189.07 -3235.83 -3247.11
Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.35
Table 3: Results of models for Spain
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Union Formation Par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e.
Constant -6.191 0.722 *** -5.645 0.798 *** -6.689 0.807 *** -6.113 0.922 ***
16-24 years old (linear spline) 0.421 0.100 *** 0.418 0.102 *** 0.416 0.110 *** 0.423 0.113 ***
more than 24 years old (linear spline) 0.090 0.086 0.095 0.091 * 0.148 0.095 ** 0.148 0.101 **
Men -1.280 0.359 *** -1.318 0.357 *** -1.365 0.389 *** -1.405 0.389 ***
Exit from education 1.960 0.480 *** 1.904 0.488 *** 1.328 0.562 *** 1.311 0.564 **
University degree 0.754 0.329 *** 0.816 0.332 *** 0.688 0.387 ** 0.748 0.393 **
Satisfaction with leisure time -0.188 0.091 ** -0.187 0.094 ** -0.230 0.107 ** -0.224 0.110 **
Member of a club -0.066 0.340 -0.074 0.352 0.024 0.380 0.029 0.400
Income lower than mean (linear spline) -0.124 0.071 * -0.149 0.085 **
Income higher than mean (linear spline) 0.052 0.028 ** 0.057 0.034 *
Out of Education
Constant -0.423 0.352 -0.356 0.382 -0.803 0.403 * -0.728 0.464
16-19 years old (linear spline) -0.257 0.124 * -0.254 0.125 * -0.178 0.137 -0.178 0.139
19-25 years old (linear spline) 0.191 0.022 *** 0.196 0.022 *** 0.302 0.030 *** 0.313 0.031 ***
more than 25 years old (linear spline) 0.064 0.040 0.057 0.038 0.121 0.072 * 0.117 0.069
Men -0.071 0.073 -0.025 0.074 -0.060 0.115 -0.003 0.116
Satisfaction with studying -0.168 0.029 *** -0.163 0.029 *** -0.220 0.045 *** -0.213 0.044 ***
Income -0.025 0.010 ** -0.037 0.015 ***
Father’s educational level -0.222 0.104 * -0.368 0.162 **
Persons per room 0.076 0.117 0.149 0.180
sigma union 1.2 1.2
sigma education 1.2 1.2
Rho 0.701 0.199 *** 0.673 0.198 ***
ln-L -3368.83 -3357.14 -3317.96 3304.87
BIC -1750.75 -1741.37 -1845.94 -15058.8
Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.36
Table 4: Results of models with joined countries, for both genders, and for women only
Model C Model D Model CW Model DW
Union Formation Par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e. par. s.e.
Constant -7.157 0.601 *** -6.495 0.650 *** -7.081 0.658 *** -6.472 0.716 ***
16-24 years old (linear spline) 0.423 0.079 *** 0.425 0.080 *** 0.405 0.086 *** 0.409 0.087 ***
more than 24 years old (linear spline) 0.178 0.041 *** 0.179 0.043 *** 0.153 0.053 *** 0.152 0.056 ***
Spain -0.099 0.207 -0.115 0.210 0.069 0.239 0.046 0.241
Men -1.141 0.227 *** -1.143 0.230 ***
Exit from education 1.245 0.392 *** 1.227 0.393 *** 1.493 0.418 *** 1.488 0.422 ***
University degree 0.629 0.268 ** 0.664 0.273 *** 0.483 0.347 0.525 0.354 *
Satisfaction with leisure time -0.114 0.070 * -0.119 0.073 * -0.098 0.086 -0.098 0.089
Member of a club 0.279 0.232 0.274 0.236 0.107 0.292 0.123 0.301
Income lower than mean (linear spline) -0.144 0.051 *** -0.136 0.062 **
Income higher than mean (linear spline) 0.044 0.016 ** 0.035 0.027
Out of Education
Constant -2.807 0.304 *** -3.042 0.348 *** -3.028 0.430 *** -3.384 0.483 ***
16-19 years old (linear spline) 0.458 0.103 *** 0.477 0.103 *** 0.484 0.146 *** 0.499 0.146 ***
19-25 years old (linear spline) 0.095 0.020 *** 0.109 0.020 *** 0.118 0.027 *** 0.133 0.028 ***
more than 25 years old (linear spline) 0.192 0.030 *** 0.193 0.029 *** 0.179 0.040 *** 0.173 0.039 ***
Spain 0.615 0.081 *** 0.661 0.084 *** 0.677 0.112 *** 0.711 0.115 ***
Men 0.029 0.080 0.081 0.080
Satisfaction with studying -0.206 0.028 *** -0.190 0.028 *** -0.188 0.039 *** -0.166 0.039 ***
Income -0.025 0.009 *** -0.021 0.013 *
Father’s educational level -0.549 0.128 *** -0.508 0.184 ***
Persons per room 0.283 0.114 *** 0.359 0.149 ***
sigma union 1.2 1.2
sigma education 1.2 1.2
Rho 0.644 0.135 *** 0.659 0.135 *** 0.655 0.159 *** 0.653 0.161 ***
ln-L -7308.07 -7275.06 -4050.98 -4034.89
BIC -3514.00 -3543.53 -1854.73 -1853.41
Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.